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1 Introduction
Cryptography is the art of code-making, code-breaking and secure communication. It
has a long history of military, diplomatic and commercial applications dating back to
ancient societies. In these lectures an introduction to basic notions of classical and
quantum cryptography is given.
A well known example of cryptosystem is the Caesar cipher. Julius Caesar allegedly
used a simple letter substitution method. Each letter of Caesar‘s message was replaced
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by the letter that followed it alphabetically by 3 places. This method is called the
Caesar cipher. The size of the shift (3 in this example) should be kept secret. It is
called the key of the cryptosystem. It is an example of the traditional cryptosystem.
It is also called the private key cryptography. Anyone who knew the enciphering key
can decipher the message. Mathematical theory of classical cryptography has been
developed by C. Shannon.
There is a problem in the private key cryptography which is called the problem
of key distribution. To establish the key, two users must use a very secure channel.
In classical world an eavesdropper in principle can monitor the channel without the
legitimate users being aware that an eavesdropping has taken place.
In 1976 W. Diffie and M. Hellman [1] discovered a new type of cryptosystem and
invented public key cryptography. In this method the problem of key distribution was
solved. A public key cryptosystem has the property that someone who knows only
how to encipher cannot use the enciphering key to find the deciphering key without
a prohibitively lengthy computation. The best-known public key cryptosystem, RSA
[2], is widely used in Internet and other business. The system relies on the difficulty of
factoring large integers.
In the 1970‘s S. Wiesner [3] and C.H. Bennett and G. Brassard [4] (their method
is the called BB84 protocol) have proposed the idea of quantum cryptography. They
used the sending of single quantum particles. The method of quantum cryptography
also can solve the key distribution problem. Moreover it can detect the presence of
an eavesdropper. In 1991 A. Ekert [5] proposed to use in quantum cryptography the
phenomena of entanglement and Bell‘s inequalities.
Experimental quantum key distribution was demonstrated for the first time in 1989
and since then tremendous progress has been made. Several groups have shown that
quantum key distribution is possible, even outside the laboratory. In particular it was
reported the creation of a key over the distance of several dozens kilometers [6].
First we discuss Caesar‘s cryptosystem and then in Sect.3 elements of number
theory needed for cryptography are discussed. In Section 4 the public key distribution
and the RSA cryptosystem is considered. The BB84 quantum cryptographic protocol
is discussed in Sect.8. Some useful notions of the mutual information and Shannon‘s
entropy are included and proofs of security of the protocol is discussed. In Sect 9.
the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bell-Ekert (EPRBE) quantum cryptographic protocol is
considered. The security of the protocol is based on Bell‘s theorem describing nonlocal
properties of entangled states. The importance of consideration of entangled states
in space and time is stressed. A modification of Bell‘s equation which includes the
spacetime variables is given and the problem of security of the EPRBE protocol in real
spacetime is discussed.
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2 Private Key Cryptosystems
Cryptography is the art of sending messages in disguised form. We shall use the
following notions.
Alphabet - a set of letters.
Plaintext - the message we want to send.
Ciphertext - the disguised message.
The plaintext and ciphertext are broken up into message units. A message unit
might be a single letter, a pair of letters or a block of k letters.
An enciphering transformation is a function f from the set P of all possible plaintext
message units to the set C of all possible ciphertext units. We assume that f is a
1− to− 1 correspondence. f : P→ C. The deciphering transformation is the map f−1
which goes back and recovers the plaintext from the ciphertext. Schematically one has
the diagram
P
f−→C f−1−−→ P
Any such set-up is called a cryptosystem.
2.1 Julius Caesar’s cryptosystem
Let us discuss the Caesar cryptosystem in more detail. Suppose we use the 26-letter
Latin alphabet A,B, . . . , Z with numerical equivalents 0, 1, . . . , 25. Let the letter
x ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 25} stands for a plaintext message unit. Define a function
f : {0, . . . , 25} → {0, . . . , 25}
by the rule
f(x) =
{
x+ 3, if x < 23
x+ 3− 26 = x− 23, if x ≥ 23
In other words f(x) ≡ x+ 3 (mod 26).
To decipher a message one subtracts 3 modulo 26.
Exercise. According to the Caesar‘s cryptosystem the word ”COLD” reads ”FROG”.
More generally consider the congruence (see Sect. 3 about the properties of con-
gruences)
f(x) = x+ b (mod N)
i.e. {
x+ b, if x < N − b
x− (N − b) = x+ b−N, if x ≥ N − b
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In the case of Caesar‘s cryptosystem N = 26, b = 3. To decipher the message one
subtracts b modulo N .
We could use a more general affine map, i.e. f(x) = ax+ b (mod N). To decipher
a message y = ax+ b (mod N) one solves for x in terms of y obtaining
x = a′y + b′ (mod N)
where a′ is the inverse of a modulo N and b′ = −a−1b (mod N). Assume a is relatively
prime to N , then there exists a−1 (see Sect.3).
In this example the enciphering function f depends upon the choice of parameters
a and b. The values of parameters are called the enciphering key KE = (a, b). In order
to compute f−1 (decipher) we need a deciphering key KD. In our example KD = (a
′, b′)
where a′ = a−1 (mod N) and b′ = −a−1b (mod N).
2.2 Symmetric Cryptosystems - DES and GOST
Suppose that the algorithm of the cryptosystem is publicly known but the keys are kept
in secret. It is a private key cryptography. Examples of such cryptosystems are Data
Encryption Standard (DES), with 56-bit private key (USA, 1980) and a more secure
GOST-28147-89 which uses 256-bit key (Russia, 1989). In such cryptosystems anyone
who knows an enciphering key can determine the deciphering key. Such cryptosystems
are called symmetric cryptosystems.
3 Elements of Number Theory
In this section we collect some relevant material from number theory [7].
Euclid‘s Algorithm. Given two integers a and b, not both zero, the greatest
common divisor of a and b, denoted g.c.d.(a, b) is the biggest integer d dividing both
a and b. For example, g.c.d.( 9, 12)= 3.
There is the well known Euclid‘s algorithm of finding the greatest common divisor.
It proceeds as follows.
Find g.c.d.(a, b) where a > b > 0.
1) Divide b into a and write down the quotient q1 and the remainder r1 :
a = q1b+ r1, 0 < r1 < b,
2) Next, perform a second division with b playing the role of a and r1 playing the role
of b:
b = q2r1 + r2, 0 < r2 < r1,
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3) Next:
r1 = q3r2 + r3, 0 < r3 < r2.
Continue in this way. When we finally obtain a remainder that divides the previous
remainder, we are done: that final nonzero remainder is the g.c.d. of a and b :
rt = qt+2rt+1 + rt+2,
rt+1 = qt+3rt+2.
We obtain: rt+2 = d =g.c.d.(a, b).
Example. Find g.c.d .(128, 24) :
128 = 5 · 24 + 8,
24 = 3 · 8
We obtain that g.c.d .(128, 24) = 8.
Let us prove that Euclid‘s algorithm indeed gives the greatest common divisor.
Note first that b > r1 > r2 > ... is a sequence of decreasing positive integers which can
not be continued indefinitely. Consequently Euclid‘s algorithm must end.
Let us go up through out Euclid‘s algorithm. rt+2 = d divides rt+1, rt, ..., r1, b, a.
Thus d is a common divisor of a and b.
Now let c be any common divisor of a and b. Go downward through out Euclid‘s
algorithm. c divides r1, r2, ..., rt+2 = d. Thus d, being a common divisor of a and b,
is divisible by any common divisor of these numbers. Consequently d is the greatest
common divisor of a and b.✷
Another (but similar) proof is based on the formula
g .c.d .(qb+ r, b) = g .c.d .(b, r).
Corollary. Note that from Euclid‘s algorithm it follows (go up) that if d =g.c.d.(a, b)
then there are integers u and v such that
d = ua+ vb. (1)
In particular one has
ua ≡ d (mod b) (2)
One can estimate the efficiency of Euclid‘s algorithm. By Lame‘s theorem the
number of divisions required to find the greatest common divisor of two integers is
never greater that five-times the number of digits in the smaller integer.
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Congruences. An integer a is congruent to b modulo m,
a ≡ b (mod m)
iff m divides (a− b). In this case a = b+ km where k = 0,±1,±2, ....
Proposition. Let us be given two integers a and m. The following are equivalent
(i) There exists u such that au ≡ 1 (mod m).
(ii) g .c.d .(a,m) = 1.
Proof. From (i) it follows
ab−mk = 1.
Therefore the g .c.d .(a,m) = 1, i.e. we get (ii).
Now if (ii) is valid then one has the relation (2) for d = 1, b = m:
au ≡ 1 (mod m)
which gives (i).✷
Let us solve in integers the equation
ax ≡ c (mod m) (3)
We suppose that g .c.d .(a,m) = 1. Then by the previous proposition there exists such
b that
ab ≡ 1 (mod m).
Multiplying Eq (3) to b we obtain the solution
x ≡ bc (mod m) (4)
or more explicitly
x = bc+ km, k = 0,±1,±2, ...
Exercise. Find all of the solutions of the congruence
3x ≡ 4 (mod 7).
Chinese Remainder Theorem. Suppose there is a system of congruences to
different moduli:
x ≡ a1 (mod m1),
x ≡ a2 (mod m2),
...
x ≡ at (mod mt)
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Suppose g .c.d .(mi, mj) = 1 for i 6= j. Then there exists a solution x to all of the
congruences, and any two solutions are congruent to one another modulo
M = m1m2...mt.
Proof. Let us denote Mi = M/mi. There exist Ni such that
MiNi ≡ 1 (mod mi)
Let us set
x =
∑
i
aiMiNi
This is the solution. Indeed we have∑
i
aiMiNi = a1M1M1 + ... ≡ a1 + a2 + ... ≡ a1 (mod m1)
and similarly for other congruences.✷
We will need also
Fermat‘s Little Theorem. Let p be a prime number. Any integer a satisfies
ap ≡ a (mod p)
and any integer a not divisible by p satisfies
ap−1 ≡ 1 (mod p).
Proof. Suppose a is not divisible by p. Then {0a, 1a, 2a, ..., (p− 1)a} form a complete
set of residues modulo p, i.e. {a, 2a, ..., (p−1)a} are a rearrangement of {1, 2, ..., p−1}
when considered modulo p. Hence the product of the numbers in the first sequence is
congruent modulo p to the product of the members in the second sequence, i.e.
ap−1(p− 1) ≡ (p− 1)! (mod p)
Thus p divides (p− 1)(ap−1 − 1). Since (p− 1)! is not divisible by p, it should be that
p divides (ap−1 − 1).✷
The Euler function.
The Euler function ϕ(n) is the number of nonnegative integers a less then n which
are prime to n:
ϕ(n) = #{0 ≤ a < n : g.c.d.(a, n) = 1}
In particular ϕ(1) = 1, ϕ(2) = 1, ..., ϕ(6) = 2, .... One has ϕ(p) = p− 1 for any prime
p.
Exercise. Prove: ϕ(pn) = pn − pn−1 for any n and prime p.
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The Euler function is multiplicative, meaning that
ϕ(mn) = ϕ(m)ϕ(n)
whenever g.c.d.(m,n) = 1.
If
n = pα11 p
α2
2 ...p
αk
k
then
ϕ(n) = n(1− 1
p1
)...(1− 1
pk
)
In particular, if n is the product of two primes, n = pq, then
ϕ(n) = ϕ(p)ϕ(q) = (p− 1)(q − 1)
There is the following generalization of Fermat‘s Little Theorem.
Euler‘s theorem. If g.c.d.(a,m) = 1 then
aϕ(m) ≡ 1 (mod m).
Proof. Let r1, r2, ..., rϕ(m) be classes of integers relatively prime to m. Such a system is
called a reduced system of residues mod m. Then ar1, ar2, ..., arϕ(m) is another reduced
system since g.c.d.(a,m) = 1. Therefore
ar1 ≡ rpi(1), ar2 ≡ rpi(2), ..., arϕ(m) ≡ rpi(m) (mod m)
On multiplying these congruences, we get
aϕ(m)r1r2...rϕ(m) ≡ r1r2...rϕ(m) (mod m)
Now since r1r2...rϕ(m) is relatively prime to m the theorem is proved.✷
4 Public Key Cryptography and RSA Cryptosys-
tem
First let us define some extra notions that we will use along with ones defined in the
previous sections.
Information channel - a way to transmit information from one endpoint to an-
other.
Trusted channel - an information channel where it is believed that is impossible
to eavesdrop the transmitted information. For example military optical communication
channels.
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Public channel - an information channel where the transmitted information could
be quite easily overheard. An example is the Internet.
Let us introduce our main characters: Alice, Bob and Eve. Alice wants to send
ciphertext to Bob. Eve, the eavesdropper, wants to catch the ciphertext and break it,
i.e. decipher without knowing the deciphering key. In our scheme in order to produce
a ciphertext from the plaintext Alice has to have an enciphering key. In turn, Bob to
read (decipher) the Alice’s ciphertext needs a deciphering key. If Alice and Bob use a
private key cryptosystem, i.e. a cryptosystem where enciphering and deciphering keys
could be easily produced one from another they come to the key distribution problem.
Indeed Alice and Bob should use a trusted channel to share the keys.
From the first glance it seems to be impossible to get rid of the need of the secret
channel. However in 1976 W. Diffie and M. Hellman [1] discovered a new type of
cryptosystem called public key cryptosystem where there is no key distribution problem
at all. A public key cryptosystem has the property that having the enciphering key
one cannot find the deciphering key without a prohibitively lengthy computation. In
other words the enciphering function f : P → C is easy to compute if the enciphering
key KE is known, but it is very hard to compute the inverse function f
−1 : C → P
without knowing the deciphering key KD even having the enciphering key KE .
One of the most widely used public key cryptosystem is RSA - a cryptosystem
named after the three inventors, Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman [2].
The RSA cryptosystem is based on the fact that in order to factorise a big natural
number with N digits any classical computer needs at least a number of steps that
grows faster than any polynomial in N . Faithfully speaking there is no rigorous proof
of this fact but all known factoring algorithms obey this fact.
Let us describe RSA cryptosystem in more detail. First we describe the protocol,
i.e. the steps our characters Alice and Bob should perform in order to allow Alice send
enciphered messages to Bob. The mathematical basis of the RSA cryptosystem will be
described in the next section.
4.1 The RSA Protocol
The RSA protocol solves the following problem. Bob wants to announce publicly a
public key such that Alice using this key will send to him an enciphering message and
nobody but Bob will be able to decipher it.
1. Bob generates public and private keys - each of them is a pair of two natural
numbers - (e, n) and (d, n). Here Ke = (e, n) is the enciphering key (public) and
Kd = (d, n) is the deciphering key (private).
In order to generate public and private keys Bob does the following:
a) Takes any two big prime numbers p and q and compute n = pq and the
value of the Euler function ϕ(n) = (p − 1)(q − 1). In modern cryptosystems
one uses log p ≈ log q ≈ 1000.
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b) Takes any e < n, such that gcd(e, ϕ(n)) = 1.
c) Computes d = e−1 (mod ϕ(n)), i.e. finds natural d such that
ed ≡ 1 (mod ϕ(n)), 1 ≤ d < ϕ(n) (5)
2. Bob sends a public key (n, e) to Alice via a public channel.
3. Alice having Bob’s public key (n, e) and a plaintext m (assume m is a natural
number and m < n) that she wants to send to Bob computes
c = me (mod n)
and sends c (ciphertext) to Bob.
4. When Bob receives c from Alice he computes
cd (mod n)
and gets the Alice’s plaintext m, because m = cd (mod n)
Nobody but Bob will be able to decipher Alice‘s message.
4.2 Mathematical Basis of the RSA Protocol
In this section we will show why the RSA cryptosystem works. Then we will discuss
the security of the protocol, i.e. how hard for Eve, the eavesdropper, to decipher the
Alice’s message without knowing the private key.
If order to prove that RSA cryptosystem works we have to prove that the compu-
tations that Bob does on the step d). of the protocol is inverse to the computations
that Alice does on the step c). That is
cd ≡ m (mod n)
From (5) we have
ed = 1 + kϕ(n), k ∈ Z
We have
cd = med = m ·mkϕ(n) (6)
Finally using the Euler’s theorem for the rhs of (6) we obtain
cd ≡ m (mod n).✷
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Now let us investigate the security of the RSA cryptosystem. It seems to be rather
straightforward for Eve to obtain the Bob’s private key having his public key. The only
thing she has to do is having n and e solve the congruence
de ≡ 1 (mod ϕ(n)), 1 ≤ d < ϕ(n)
The problem that Eve would face here is to compute ϕ(n). To this end she has to know
p and q, i.e. she has to solve the factoring problem. The practical solution of this
problem is not possible with modern technology. For a discussion of this problem see
for example [8].
5 Shannon’s Entropy and Mutual Information
Here we summarize some notions from information theory [10, 12, 13] used in quantum
cryptography for the consideration of security of quantum cryptographic protocols.
Privacy is often expressed in terms of Shannon’s entropy or mutual information.
Let (Ω,F , P ) be a probability space and X , Y and Z three random variables taking
values in a discrete set on the real line. Let p(x, y, z) = P (X = x ∧ Y = y ∧ Z = z)
is the joint distribution, p(x, y) = P (X = x ∧ Y = y) is the marginal distribution,
p(x|y) = P (X = x | Y = y) is the conditional distribution, and p(x) = P (X = x),
p(y) = P (Y = y).
The Shannon entropy of X is given by
H(X) = −
∑
x
p(x) log p(x).
The mutual information between X and Y is given by
I(X ; Y ) =
∑
x,y
p(x, y) log
(
p(x, y)
p(x)p(y)
)
.
The conditional Shannon entropy of X given Y is given by
H(X | Y ) = −
∑
x,y
p(x, y) log p(x|y).
One has
I(X ; Y ) = H(X)−H(X | Y ) = H(Y )−H(Y |X).
The conditional mutual information between X and Y given Z is
I(X ; Y |Z) =
∑
x,y,z
p(x, y, z) log
(
p(x, y|z)
p(x|z)p(y|z)
)
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Quantum entropy of an observable A in the state ρ is defined by
H(A, ρ) = −
∑
i
p(i, ρ) log p(i, ρ) (7)
where p(·, ρ) is the probability distribution of an observable A in the state ρ. If the
state ρ is pure, i.e. ρ = |ϕ〉〈ϕ|, where ϕ is a unit vector in a Hilbert space, one can
rewrite (7) as
H(A,ϕ) = −
∑
i
|〈ξi|ϕ〉|2 log |〈ξi|ϕ〉|2 (8)
where {|ξi〉} is an orthonormal basis consisting from eigenvectors of the observable A.
6 Entropic Uncertainty Relations
The fundamental Heisenberg uncertainty relation is a particular case of the Robertson
inequality
∆(A,ψ)∆(B,ψ) ≥ 1
2
|〈ψ|[A,B]ψ〉|
where A and B are two observables and
∆(A,ψ) =
√
〈ψ|(A− 〈ψ|Aψ〉)2ψ〉
Here we discuss a generalization of the uncertainty relation which uses the notions of
entropy and mutual information.
Theorem 1. For any nondegenerate observables A and B in the finite dimensional
Hilbert space the entropic uncertainty relation holds [9, 10]
H(A, ρ) +H(B, ρ) ≥ −2 log c (9)
where c is defined as the maximum possible overlap of the eigenstates of A and B
c ≡ max
a,b
|〈a|b〉| (10)
Here {|a〉} and {|b〉} are orthonormal bases consisting from eigenvectors of A and B
respectively.
One can check that for any nondegenerate observable A in N -dimensional Hilbert
space there exists an upper bound on the entropy
H(A, ρ) ≤ logN (11)
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Let us illustrate the entropic uncertainty relation on a simple spin-1
2
particle. Taking
Pauli matrices
σx =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, σz =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
(12)
as an observables with eigenstates
h1 =
1√
2
(
1
1
)
, h2 =
1√
2
(
1
−1
)
, e1 =
(
0
1
)
, e2 =
(
1
0
)
(13)
we compute c = 1/
√
2. Now taking 2 as a base of the logarithm, the relation (9) states
that for any unit vector ϕ ∈ C2 it holds∑
i=1,2
(|〈ei|ϕ〉|2 log |〈ei|ϕ〉|2 + |〈hi|ϕ〉|2 log |〈hi|ϕ〉|2) ≤ −1 (14)
Now we will formulate the uncertainty relation using the mutual information. Con-
sider a quantum system which is described by density operator ρi with probability pi.
Then the density operator of the whole ensemble E = {ρi} of all possible states of the
system is given by
ρ =
∑
i
piρi
The mutual information corresponding to a measurement of an observable A is given
by
I(A, E) = H(A, ρ)−
∑
i
piH(A, ρi)
From (9) using (11) one can obtain the following theorem (information exclusion
relation [11])
Theorem 2. Let A and B be arbitrary observables in N -dimensional Hilbert space,
then
I(A, E) + I(B, E) ≤ 2 logNc
where c is defined by (10).
7 The No Cloning Theorem
The eavesdropper, Eve, wants to have a perfect copy of Alice‘s message. However
Wootters and Zurek [14] proved that perfect copying is impossible in the quantum
world.
It is instructive to start with the following
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Proposition. If H is a Hilbert space and φ0 is a vector from H then there is no a
linear map M : H⊗H → H⊗H with the property M(ψ ⊗ φ0) = ψ ⊗ ψ for any ψ.
Proof. Indeed we would have
M(2ψ ⊗ φ0) = 2ψ ⊗ 2ψ = 4ψ ⊗ ψ
But because of linearity we should have
M(2ψ ⊗ φ0) = 2M(ψ ⊗ φ0) = 2ψ ⊗ ψ
This contradiction proves the claim. Now let us prove the no cloning theorem.
Theorem. Let H and K be two Hilbert spaces, dimH ≥ 2. Let M be a a linear
map (copy machine)
M : H⊗H⊗K → H⊗H⊗K
with the property
M(ψ ⊗ φ0 ⊗ ξ0) = ψ ⊗ ψ ⊗ ηψ
for any ψ ∈ H and some nonzero vectors ψ0 ∈ H and ξ0 ∈ K where ηψ ∈ K can depend
on ψ. Then M is a trivial map, M = 0 (i.e. ηψ = 0 for any ψ).
Proof. Let {ei} be an orthonormal basis in H. We have
M(ei ⊗ φ0 ⊗ ξ0) = ei ⊗ ei ⊗ ηi
where ηi are some vectors in K. To prove the theorem we prove that ηi = 0. If i 6= j
then (ei + ej)/
√
2 is a unit vector (here we use that dimH ≥ 2). We have the equality
1√
2
(ei + ej)⊗ φ0 ⊗ ξ0 = 1√
2
ei ⊗ φ0 ⊗ ξ0 + 1√
2
ej ⊗ φ0 ⊗ ξ0
Let us apply the map M to both sides of this equality. Then we get
1√
2
(ei + ej)⊗ 1√
2
(ei + ej)⊗ ηij = 1√
2
ei ⊗ 1√
2
ei ⊗ ηi + 1√
2
ej ⊗ 1√
2
ej ⊗ ηj (15)
where ηij is a vector in K. We can rewrite (15) as
ei ⊗ ei ⊗ (ηij − ηi) + ei ⊗ ej ⊗ ηij + ej ⊗ ei ⊗ ηij + ej ⊗ ej ⊗ (ηij − ηj) = 0
Now taking into account that ei and ej belong to a basis in H we get
ηij − ηi = 0, ηij = 0, ηij − ηj = 0
Hence ηi = 0 for any i and Theorem is proved.
Remark. If dimH = 1, i.e. H = C, then Theorem is not valid. For φ0 = 1 and
ψ ∈ C one can set M(ψξ0) = ψξ0 = ψ2ηψ where ηψ = ξ0/ψ for ψ 6= 0.
15
We proved that Eve can not get a perfect quantum copy because perfect quantum
copy machines can not exist. The possibility to copy classical information is one of
the most crucial features of information needed for eavesdropping. The quantum no
cloning theorem prevents Eve from perfect eavesdropping, and hence makes quantum
cryptography potentially secure.
Note however that though there is no a perfect quantum cloning machine but there
are cloning machines that achieve the optimal approximate cloning transformation
compatible with the no cloning theorem, see [15, 16].
8 The BB84 Quantum Cryptographic Protocol
Quantum cryptographic protocols differ from the classical ones in that their security is
based on the laws of quantum mechanics, rather than the conjectured computational
difficulty of certain functions. In this section we will describe the Bennett and Brassard
(BB84) quantum cryptographic protocol [4].
8.1 The BB84 Protocol
First let us describe the physical devices used by Alice and Bob.
Alice has a photon emitter - a device which is capable to emit single photons that
are linear polarized in one of four directions. The polarizations are described by the four
unit vectors in C2 here they are e1, e2, h1, h2 given in (13). We will call the polarizations
vertical, horizontal, diagonal, anti-diagonal ones and denote them respectively ( | , —
,  , upslope ). We have two bases in C2. One basis, Gz = {e1, e2}, describes the vertical
and horizontal polarizations. Another basis, Gx = {h1, h2}, describes the diagonal and
anti-diagonal polarizations. Note that one has
|(ei, hj)| = 1/
√
2, i, j = 1, 2 (16)
Bases with such a property are called conjugate. Note also that the vectors e1, e2 from
the basis Gz and h1, h2 from the basis Gx are the eigenvectors of the Pauli matrices σz
and σx respectively, see (12).
Bob has a photon detector - a device that detects single photons in one of the
two bases.
Alice can send photons emitted by the photon emitter to Bob and Bob detects the
photons with the photon detector.
The Protocol.
1. Alice chooses a random polarization basis and prepares photons with a random
polarization that belongs to the chosen basis. She sends the photons to Bob.
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2. For each photon Bob chooses at random which polarization basis he will use,
and measures the polarization of the photon. (If Bob chooses the same basis as Alice
he can for sure identify the polarization of the photon).
3. Alice and Bob use the public channel to compare the polarization bases they
used. They keep only the polarization data for which the polarization bases are the
same. In the absence of errors and eavesdropping these data should be the same on
both sides, it is called a raw key.
4. At the last step Alice and Bob use methods of classical information theory to
check whether their raw keys are the same. For example, they choose a random subset
of the raw key and compare it using the public channel. They compute the error
rate (that is, the fraction of data for which their values disagree). If the error rate is
unreasonably high - above, say, 10% - they abort the protocol and may be try again
later. If the error rate is not that high they could use error correction codes.
As a result of the protocol Alice and Bob share the same random data. This data
could now be used as a private key in the symmetric cryptosystems.
Instead of polarized photons one can use any two level quantum system. One can
consider also a generalized quantum key distribution protocol using a d-dimensional
Hilbert space with k bases, each basis has d states, [31, 32, 33, 34].
8.2 BB84 Security
In transmitting information, there are always some errors and Alice and Bob must
apply some classical information processing protocols to improve their data . They
can use error correction to obtain identical keys and privacy amplification to obtain a
secret key. To solve the problem of eavesdropping one has to find a protocol which,
assuming that Alice and Bob can only measure the error rate of the received data,
either provides Alice and Bob with a secure key, or aborts the protocol and tells the
parties that the key distribution has failed. There are various eavesdropping problems,
depending in particular on the technological power which Eve could have and on the
assumed fidelity of Alice and Bob’s devices, [6, 16, 17].
There is a simple eavesdropping strategy, called intercept-resend. Eve measures
each qubit in one of the two basis and resends to Bob a qubit in the state corresponding
to the result of her measurement. This attack belongs to the class of the so called
individual attacks. In this way Eve will get 50% information. However Alice and Bob
can detect the actions of Eve because they will have 25% of errors in their sifted key.
But it would be not so easy to detect eavesdropping if Eve applies the intercept-resend
strategy to only a fraction of the Alice‘s sending.
In this case one can use methods of classical cryptography. We suppose that once
Alice, Bob and Eve have made their measurements, they will get classical random
variables α, β and ǫ respectively, with a joint probability distribution p(x, y, z). Let
I(α, β) be the mutual information of Alice and Bob and I(α, ǫ) and I(β, ǫ) the mutual
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information of Alice and Eve and Bob and Eve respectively. Intuitively, it is clear that
only if Bob has more information on Alice‘s bits then Eve then it could be possible to
establish a secret key between Alice and Bob. In fact one can prove (see [35, 6]) the
following
Theorem 1. Alice and Bob can establish a secret key (using error correction and
privacy amplification) if, and only if
I(α, β) ≥ I(α, ǫ) or I(α, β) ≥ I(β, ǫ).
Let D be the error rate. Then one can prove that the BB84 protocol is secure
against individual attacks if one has the following bound
D < D0 ≡ 1− 1/
√
2
2
≈ 15%
There have been discussed also more general coherent or joint attacks when Eve mea-
sures several qubits simultaneously. An important problem of the eavesdropping anal-
ysis is to find quantum cryptosystems for which one can prove its ultimate security.
Ultimate security means that the security is guaranteed against the whole class of
eavesdropping attacks, even if Eve uses any conceivable technology of future.
We assume that Eve has perfect technology which is only limited by the laws of
quantum mechanics. This means she can use any unitary transformation between any
number of qubits and an arbitrary auxiliary system. But Eve is not allowed to come
to Alice’s lab and read all her data.
8.3 Ultimate Security Proofs
Main ideas on how to prove security of BB84 protocol were presented by D. Mayers [13]
in 1996. The security issues are considered in recent papers [13, 18, 19, 20, 21], [31]-[45].
We describe here a simple and general method proposed in [6, 32, 33]. The method is
based on Theorem 1 from Sect. 8.2 on classical cryptography and on Theorem 2 from
Sect. 6 on information uncertainty relations.
The argument runs as follows. Suppose Alice sends out a large number of qubits
and Bob receives n of them in the correct basis. The relevant Hilbert space dimension
is then 2n. Let us re-label the bases used for each of the n qubits in such a way that
Alice used n times the x-basis. Hence, Bob’s observable is the n-time tensor product
σx⊗ . . .⊗σx. Since Eve had no way to know the correct bases, her optimal information
on the correct ones is precisely the same as her optimal information on the incorrect
ones. Hence one can bound her information assuming she measures σz ⊗ ... ⊗ σz.
Therefore c = 2−n/2 and Theorem 2 from Sect. 6 implies:
I(α, ǫ) + I(α, β) ≤ 2 log2(2n2−n/2) = n (17)
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Next, combining the bound (17) with Theorem 1 from Sect. 8.2, one deduces that a
secret key is achievable if I(α, β) ≥ n/2. Using
I(α, β) = n (1−D log2D − (1−D) log2(1−D))
one obtains the sufficient condition on the error rate D:
−D log2D − (1−D) log2(1−D) ≤
1
2
i.e. D ≤ 11%. This bound was obtained in Mayers proof (after improvement by P.
Shor and J. Preskill[21]). It is compatible with the 15% bound found for individual
attacks.
One can argue, however, that previous arguments lead in fact to another result:
c = 2−n/4. Indeed, Bob’s observable is the n-time tensor product σx ⊗ .....⊗ σx. Now,
since Eve had no way to know the correct basis it was assumed that she measures
σz ⊗ ..... ⊗ σz. However it seems if Eve does not know the correct basis then her
observables σi will be complementary observables to σx only in the half of cases. In
the other half of cases her observables σi will be the same as Bob’s, i.e. σx. Therefore
one gets: c = (1/
√
2)n/2 = 2−n/4. This leads to a lower error rate, instead of 11% one
gets 4%.
9 The EPRBE Quantum Cryptographic Protocol
9.1 Quantum Nonlocality and Cryptography
Bell’s theorem [22] states that there are quantum correlation functions that can not
be represented as classical correlation functions of separated random variables. It has
been interpreted as incompatibility of the requirement of locality with the statistical
predictions of quantum mechanics [22]. For a recent discussion of Bell’s theorem see,
for example [23] - [30] and references therein. It is now widely accepted, as a result
of Bell’s theorem and related experiments, that ”local realism” must be rejected.
Bell’s theorem constitutes an important part in quantum cryptography [5]. It is
now generally accepted that techniques of quantum cryptography can allow secure
communications between distant parties . The promise of some secure cryptographic
quantum key distribution schemes is based on the use of quantum entanglement in
the spin space and on quantum no-cloning theorem. An important contribution of
quantum cryptography is a mechanism for detecting eavesdropping.
Let us stress that the very formulation of the problem of locality in quantum me-
chanics is based on ascribing a special role to the position in ordinary three-dimensional
space. However the space dependence of the wave function is neglected in many dis-
cussions of the problem of locality in relation to Bell’s inequalities. Actually it is the
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space part of the wave function which is relevant to the consideration of the problem
of locality.
It was pointed out in [25] that the space part of the wave function leads to an
extra factor in quantum correlation which changes the Bell equation. It was suggested
a criterion of locality (or nonlocality) of quantum theory in a realist model of hidden
variables. In particular predictions of quantum mechanics can be consistent with Bell’s
inequalities for some Gaussian wave functions.
If one neglects the space part of the wave function in a cryptographic scheme then
such a scheme could be insecure in the real three-dimensional space.
We will discuss how one can try to improve the security of quantum cryptography
schemes in space by using a special preparation of the space part of the wave function,
see [29].
9.2 Bell’s Inequalities
In the presentation of Bell’s theorem we will follow [25] where one can find also more
references, see [30] for more details. The mathematical formulation of Bell’s theorem
reads:
cos(α− β) 6= Eξαηβ (18)
where ξα and ηβ are two random processes such that |ξα| ≤ 1, |ηβ| ≤ 1 and E is the
expectation. Let us discuss in more details the physical interpretation of this result.
Consider a pair of spin one-half particles formed in the singlet spin state and moving
freely towards two detectors (Alice and Bob). If one neglects the space part of the wave
function then the quantum mechanical correlation of two spins in the singlet state ψspin
is
Dspin(a, b) = 〈ψspin|σ · a⊗ σ · b|ψspin〉 = −a · b (19)
Here a and b are two unit vectors in three-dimensional space, σ = (σ1, σ2, σ3) are the
Pauli matrices and
ψspin =
1√
2
((
0
1
)
⊗
(
1
0
)
−
(
1
0
)
⊗
(
0
1
))
Bell’s theorem states that the function Dspin(a, b) Eq. (19) can not be represented
in the form
P (a, b) =
∫
ξ(a, λ)η(b, λ)dρ(λ) (20)
i.e.
Dspin(a, b) 6= P (a, b) (21)
20
Here ξ(a, λ) and η(b, λ) are random fields on the sphere, |ξ(a, λ)| ≤ 1, |η(b, λ)| ≤ 1 and
dρ(λ) is a positive probability measure,
∫
dρ(λ) = 1. The parameters λ are interpreted
as hidden variables in a realist theory. It is clear that Eq. (21) can be reduced to
Eq. (18).
One has the following Bell-Clauser-Horn-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) inequality
|P (a, b)− P (a, b′) + P (a′, b) + P (a′, b′)| ≤ 2 (22)
From the other hand there are such vectors (ab = a′b = a′b′ = −ab′ = √2/2) for which
one has
|Dspin(a, b)−Dspin(a, b′) +Dspin(a′, b) +Dspin(a′, b′)| = 2
√
2 (23)
Therefore if one supposes that Dspin(a, b) = P (a, b) then one gets the contradiction.
It will be shown below that if one takes into account the space part of the wave
function then the quantum correlation in the simplest case will take the form g cos(α−
β) instead of just cos(α−β) where the parameter g describes the location of the system
in space and time. In this case one can get the representation [25]
g cos(α− β) = Eξαηβ (24)
if g is small enough (see below). The factor g gives a contribution to visibility or
efficiency of detectors that are used in the phenomenological description of detectors.
9.3 Localized Detectors
In the previous section the space part of the wave function of the particles was neglected.
However exactly the space part is relevant to the discussion of locality. The complete
wave function is ψ = (ψαβ(r1, r2)) where α and β are spinor indices and r1 and r2 are
vectors in three-dimensional space.
We suppose that Alice and Bob have detectors which are located within the two
localized regions OA and OB respectively, well separated from one another.
Quantum correlation describing the measurements of spins by Alice and Bob at
their localized detectors is
G(a,OA, b,OB) = 〈ψ|σ · aPOA ⊗ σ · bPOB |ψ〉 (25)
Here PO is the projection operator onto the region O.
Let us consider the case when the wave function has the form of the product of the
spin function and the space function ψ = ψspinφ(r1, r2). Then one has
G(a,OA, b,OB) = g(OA,OB)Dspin(a, b) (26)
21
where the function
g(OA,OB) =
∫
OA×OB
|φ(r1, r2)|2dr1dr2 (27)
describes correlation of particles in space. It is the probability to find one particle in
the region OA and another particle in the region OB.
One has
0 ≤ g(OA,OB) ≤ 1 (28)
Remark. In relativistic quantum field theory there is no nonzero strictly localized
projection operator that annihilates the vacuum. It is a consequence of the Reeh-
Schlieder theorem. Therefore, apparently, the function g(OA,OB) should be always
strictly smaller than 1.
Now one inquires whether one can write the representation
g(OA,OB)Dspin(a, b) =
∫
ξ(a,OA, λ)η(b,OB, λ)dρ(λ) (29)
Note that if we are interested in the conditional probability of finding the projection
of spin along vector a for the particle 1 in the region OA and the projection of spin
along the vector b for the particle 2 in the region OB then we have to divide both sides
of Eq. (29) to g(OA,OB).
The factor g is important. In particular one can write the following representation
[24] for 0 ≤ g ≤ 1/2:
g cos(α− β) =
∫ 2pi
0
√
2g cos(α− λ)
√
2g cos(β − λ)dλ
2π
(30)
Let us now apply these considerations to quantum cryptography.
9.4 The EPRBE Quantum Key Distribution
Ekert [5] showed that one can use the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen correlations to establish
a secret random key between two parties (”Alice” and ”Bob”). Bell’s inequalities are
used to check the presence of an intermediate eavesdropper (”Eve”). We will call
this method the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bell-Ekert (EPRBE) quantum cryptographic
protocol. There are two stages to the EPRBE protocol, the first stage over a quantum
channel, the second over a public channel.
The quantum channel consists of a source that emits pairs of spin one-half parti-
cles, in a singlet state. The particles fly apart towards Alice and Bob, who, after the
particles have separated, perform measurements on spin components along one of three
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directions, given by unit vectors a and b. In the second stage Alice and Bob commu-
nicate over a public channel.They announce in public the orientation of the detectors
they have chosen for particular measurements. Then they divide the measurement
results into two separate groups: a first group for which they used different orientation
of the detectors, and a second group for which they used the same orientation of the
detectors. Now Alice and Bob can reveal publicly the results they obtained but within
the first group of measurements only. This allows them, by using Bell’s inequality, to
establish the presence of an eavesdropper (Eve). The results of the second group of
measurements can be converted into a secret key. One supposes that Eve has a detector
which is located within the region OE and she is described by hidden variables λ.
We will interpret Eve as a hidden variable in a realist theory and will study whether
the quantum correlation Eq. (26) can be represented in the form Eq. (20). From (22),
(23) and (29) one can see that if the following inequality
g(OA,OB) ≤ 1/
√
2 (31)
is valid for regions OA and OB which are well separated from one another then there is
no violation of the CHSH inequalities (22) and therefore Alice and Bob can not detect
the presence of an eavesdropper. On the other side, if for a pair of well separated
regions OA and OB one has
g(OA,OB) > 1/
√
2 (32)
then it could be a violation of the realist locality in these regions for a given state.
Then, in principle, one can hope to detect an eavesdropper in these circumstances.
Note that if we set g(OA,OB) = 1 in (29) as it was done in the original proof of
Bell’s theorem, then it means we did a special preparation of the states of particles
to be completely localized inside of detectors. There exist such well localized states
(see however the previous Remark) but there exist also another states, with the wave
functions which are not very well localized inside the detectors, and still particles in
such states are also observed in detectors. The fact that a particle is observed inside the
detector does not mean, of course, that its wave function is strictly localized inside the
detector before the measurement. Actually one has to perform a thorough investigation
of the preparation and the evolution of our entangled states in space and time if one
needs to estimate the function g(OA,OB).
9.5 Gaussian Wave Functions
Now let us consider the criterion of locality for Gaussian wave functions. We will show
that with a reasonable accuracy there is no violation of locality in this case. Let us take
the wave function φ of the form φ = ψ1(r1)ψ2(r2) where the individual wave functions
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have the moduli
|ψ1(r)|2 = (m
2
2π
)3/2e−m
2
r
2/2, |ψ2(r)|2 = (m
2
2π
)3/2e−m
2(r−l)2/2 (33)
We suppose that the length of the vector l is much larger than 1/m. We can make
measurements of POA and POB for any well separated regions OA and OB. Let us
suppose a rather nonfavorite case for the criterion of locality when the wave functions
of the particles are almost localized inside the regions OA and OB respectively. In such
a case the function g(OA,OB) can take values near its maximum. We suppose that the
region OA is given by |ri| < 1/m, r = (r1, r2, r3) and the region OB is obtained from
OA by translation on l. Hence ψ1(r1) is a Gaussian function with modules appreciably
different from zero only in OA and similarly ψ2(r2) is localized in the region OB. Then
we have
g(OA,OB) =
(
1√
2π
∫ 1
−1
e−x
2/2dx
)6
(34)
One can estimate (34) as
g(OA,OB) <
(
2
π
)3
(35)
which is smaller than 1/2. Therefore the locality criterion (31) is satisfied in this case.
Let us remind that there is a well known effect of expansion of wave packets due
to the free time evolution. If ǫ is the characteristic length of the Gaussian wave packet
describing a particle of mass M at time t = 0 then at time t the characteristic length
ǫt will be
ǫt = ǫ
√
1 +
~2t2
M2ǫ4
. (36)
It tends to (~/Mǫ)t as t → ∞. Therefore the locality criterion is always satisfied
for nonrelativistic particles if regions OA and OB are far enough from each other.
10 Conclusions
In quantum cryptography there are many interesting open problems which require fur-
ther investigations. In quantum cryptographic protocols with two entangled photons
(such as the EPRBE protocol) to detect the eavesdropper’s presence by using Bell’s
inequality we have to estimate the function g(OA,OB). In order to increase the de-
tectability of the eavesdropper one has to do a thorough investigation of the process
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of preparation of the entangled state and then its evolution in space and time towards
Alice and Bob. One has to develop a proof of the security of such a protocol.
In the previous section Eve was interpreted as an abstract hidden variable. However
one can assume that more information about Eve is available. In particular one can
assume that she is located somewhere in space in a region OE . It seems that one has
to study a generalization of the function g(OA,OB), which depends not only on the
Alice and Bob locations OA and OB but also on Eve’s location OE . Then one can try
to find a strategy which leads to an optimal value of this function.
In quantum cryptographic protocols with single photons (such as the BB84 pro-
tocol) further investigation of the security under various types of attacks, including
attacks from real space, would be desirable.
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